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BEHIND SECTION 523(A)(16) POLICY AND THE 
UNNECESSARY BURDEN IT PLACES ON DEBTOR HOA
MEMBERS 
Austin D. Murray*
“The purpose of [the Bankruptcy Code] has been again and 
again emphasized . . . it gives to the honest but unfortunate 
debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he 
owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and 
a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure 
and discouragement of pre-existing debt.”†
–Justice Sutherland 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although debtors generally seek bankruptcy to obtain a fresh start 
through the discharge of their pre-petition debts in exchange for their current 
assets or a portion of their future earnings, Congress has carved out multiple 
exceptions to this discharge for public policy reasons.1 Some exceptions to 
discharge are due to the debtor’s violation of some behavioral standard spec-
ified in the Bankruptcy Code.2 Other exceptions, such as section 523(a)(16), 
which is the focus of this Comment, are based solely on the nature of the debt 
and avoiding potentially harsh repercussions of non-payment to the creditor.  
Section 523(a)(16) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge all 
post-petition fees or assessments with respect to the debtor’s interest in a unit 
that has condominium ownership, in a share of a cooperative corporations, or 
a lot in a homeowner’s association (collectively “HOAs”) for as long as the 
debtor or the trustee has a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest 
in such a unit.3 Although only pre-petition debts are typically dischargeable, 
HOA fees and assessments present a unique situation where a post-petition 
debt is the result of a pre-petition agreement between the HOA and the home-
owner. Such debts may continue to accrue for months, even years, after the 
debtor has gone through the bankruptcy proceeding and yearns for a much 
needed fresh start.4 At its inception, section 523(a)(16) excepted from dis-
charge only post-petition HOA fees and assessments while the debtor contin-
ued to live on the property or rented out the property.5 However, in amending 
this section in 2005, Congress has significantly increased the burden on the 
1 Cara O’Neill, Nondischargeable Debts in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/nondischargeable-debts-chapter-7-bankruptcy.html (last vis-
ited January 20, 2017) (The Bankruptcy Code lists 19 categories of nondischargeable debt. These are debts 
Congress has determined not dischargeable for public policy reasons based on the nature of the debt or 
the fact that the debts were incurred due to improper behavior.). 
2 Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy, HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (1985). 
3 See 11 U.S.C.A.  § 523(a)(16) (West 2017). 
4 See Amy Loftsgordon, States With Long Foreclosure Timelines, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/le-
gal-encyclopedia/states-with-long-foreclosure-timelines.html [hereinafter Loftsgordon, Foreclosure 
Timelines] (last visited January 20, 2017). 
5 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (1994). 
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debtor to continue paying the fees for as long as the debtor has legal, equita-
ble, or possessory ownership.6 Unfortunately for the debtor-member, it is not 
so easy to shed ownership, especially when the mortgagee is unwilling to 
foreclose.7 However, the 2005 amendment was a victory for HOAs and hous-
ing communities who found Congress receptive to their appeals to expand 
the 1994 exception to discharge.8
However, this has not silenced the controversy that has surrounded sec-
tion 523(a)(16) even from its inception in 1994. For instance, the original 
provision itself was lobbied against by the National Association of Consumer 
Bankruptcy Attorneys (“NACBA”), who strongly disapproved of Congress 
expanding the scope of nondischargeable debts beyond wrongful conduct by 
the debtor or protection of important governmental interests.9 But even this 
departure from historic bankruptcy law was not enough to satisfy HOA cred-
itors who believed they were entitled to more protection. The main arguments 
behind this belief were that post-petition assessments are not a claim covered 
by section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code and that HOA fees are a covenant 
that runs with the land rather than a contractual agreement;10 this is all to say 
that HOA fees and assessments are per se nondischargeable.  
Congress has never expressed whether it agrees with either of those ar-
guments, just that it believed HOAs were entitled to more protection as a 
matter of policy.11 Congress certainly considered the importance of HOAs in 
maintaining the property values within such associations. When HOAs do 
not receive payment from their homeowners, there is a direct impact on the 
level of upkeep and maintenance an HOA can afford to put into the common 
areas that all residents enjoy and that property values are largely based on. 
More importantly, paying homeowners might be forced to shoulder the loss 
by either picking up the slack or simply dealing with deteriorating property 
values while they live in a less desirable community.12
6 11 U.S.C.A § 523(a)(16) (West 2005). 
7 Jeffery S. Adams, Rewriting 11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(16): The Problems of Delayed Foreclosure and 
Judicial Activism, 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 347, 349 (2014) (“‘With the real estate collapse, lenders, 
who otherwise have the right to do so, are choosing not to foreclose on their collateral[,] leaving home-
owners in limbo.’”) (quoting In re Pigg, 453 B.R. 728, 733 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011)). 
8 See In re Pigg, 453 B.R. at 733 (describing § 523(a)(16)’s expanded coverage as “the result of 
some special interest lobbying . . . .”). 
9 Veryl Victoria Miles, Fairness, Responsibility, and Efficiency in the Bankruptcy Discharge: Are 
the Commission’s Recommendations Enough?, 102 DICK. L. REV. 795, 804 (1998). 
10 Alfred Q. Ricotta, Community Associations and Bankruptcy: Why Postpetition Assessments 
Should not be Dischargeable, 15 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 187, 210 (1998). 
11 See 140 CONG. REC. S4526 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond) (not-
ing that association members “may be unfairly burdened by increases in their association fees if their 
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As strong as this policy may be, when one considers the position of the 
debtor homeowners who surrendered their assets in bankruptcy and are not 
living on the property or benefitting from it in any way, it is essential to con-
sider if there are alternative mechanisms for protecting the parties involved. 
Presently, debtor homeowners are not only burdened by post-petition HOA 
fees and assessments, but are also at the mercy of their lenders who can delay 
sale of the home for as long as they please.13 Therefore, this Comment urges 
Congress to rethink the necessity of excepting from discharge post-petition 
HOA fees and assessments when the debtor-member is not living on or ben-
efiting from the property.  
Currently, the Bankruptcy Code treats a debtor’s right to a fresh start 
and an HOAs’ right to payment as competing interests where one must suffer 
to protect the other. With the 2005 amendment to section 523(a)(16) Con-
gress tipped the scales in HOAs’ favor by keeping the debtor on the hook for 
HOA fees and assessments until the debtor no longer has any legal, equitable, 
and possessory interests in the property.14
This Comment asserts that Congress overlooked a few important con-
siderations in concluding that the only way to protect HOAs was to have the 
debtor bear the entire burden. Not only is this an unrealistic way to protect 
the HOAs’ interests, considering the debtor’s insolvency,15 but it is also an 
unnecessary deviation from bankruptcy law’s “fresh start” policy.16 The con-
siderations that Congress overlooked are: (1) the bank has a pecuniary incen-
tive in maintaining the property;17 (2) state laws allow banks to delay fore-
closure indefinitely;18 and (3) accruing HOA fees against the debtor 
unintentionally benefits the bank and does not incentivize it to take action.19
With these considerations in mind, Congress should recognize the 
mechanisms available to HOAs to mitigate the impact of an HOA member’s 
bankruptcy proceeding, such as lien foreclosure and rent collection. This 
would result in a more equitable outcome than having the debtor-member 
shoulder the entire burden of the accumulating obligation. For example, if 
Congress were to discharge post-petition HOA assessments when the debtor 
13 Brandt H. Stitzer, HOA Fees: A BAPCPA Death-Trap, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1419 
(2013); see also Adams, supra note 7, at 357 (stating “the liability could theoretically continue ‘in perpe-
tuity.’”). 
14 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(16) (West 2005). 
15 Stitzer, supra note 13, at 1426 (stating that “lack of member equity has rendered § 523(a)(16) 
of little value to associations.”). 
16 Id.
17 See In re Pigg, 453 B.R. 728, 732 n.5 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011). 
18 Christopher W. Frost, Zombie Titles and Bankruptcy: In re Canning, 33 No. 6 BANKR. L.
LETTER 1, 1 (2013) (stating that mortgagees may decide that the risks and costs of foreclosure are not 
worth the effort). 
19 See In re Pigg, 453 B.R. at 732 n.5. 
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is not living on the property, HOAs could promptly foreclose on their assess-
ment lien and collect rent on the property until the bank forecloses or possibly 
redeems the property by paying off the assessment lien. This would result in 
the HOA receiving payment for its fees and assessments without unduly bur-
dening the debtor-member or the mortgage lender.  
Because Congress has not taken an express position as to whether post-
petition HOA fees and assessments are a dischargeable claim under section 
101(5), courts are still struggling with how to treat the debt.20 For example, 
courts addressing chapter 13 bankruptcy cases, which require looking toward 
section 1328(b) rather than section 523 to determine which debts are non-
dishcargeable, are torn as to the dischargeability of post-petition HOA as-
sessments, which are not expressly excepted from discharge within section 
1328(b).21 Therefore, there are important reasons for Congress to confirm or 
deny that section 523(a)(16) is essential to excepting HOA assessments from 
discharge in the typical chapter 7 bankruptcy filing. In other words, Congress 
should take an express stance on whether post-petition HOA fees and assess-
ments are considered a claim under the Bankruptcy Code. With that said, this 
Comment will proceed by addressing Congress’ implicit view of section 
523(a)(16), its purpose, and whether, contrary to popular arguments, post-
petition HOA fees and assessments meet the Bankruptcy Code’s definition 
of a claim under section 101(5).22
Section I begins with an historical overview, which describes the disso-
nant judicial backdrop that lead to the introduction of the first version of sec-
tion 523(a)(16) in 1994. The Background section is divided into three sub-
sections. Subsection A explores the possible and likely influences that guided 
Congress to its eventual 2005 amendment, which drastically changed who 
the section 523(a)(16) exception to discharge applies to. Subsection B then 
explains the impact that 2008’s financial crisis had on the real estate market 
and subsequently on the length of the foreclosure process, and how this has 
levied a significant burden on debtor homeowners who are considered to 
20 See In re Hall, 454 B.R. 230, 238 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011) (“It is just as likely that Congress was 
implying that post-petition assessments are not really claims at all, and that the amendment was necessary 
to correct the mischaracterization of post-petition assessments as claims.”); see also In re Spencer, 457 
B.R. 601 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (holding that a debtor’s obligation for condominium assessments on unit that 
he continued to own postpetition, even after announcing his intent to surrender unit, was obligation which 
ran with the land and which debtor could not discharge as personal prepetition obligation of debtor). But 
see In re Hawk, 314 B.R. 312, 316-17 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2004) (“By defining the parameters of when post-
petition fees and assessments can and cannot [be] discharged, Congress was implicitly stating that these 
future assessments are claims.”). 
21 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1328(a) (West 2005) (defining the scope of Chapter 13 discharge, but declin-
ing to incorporate § 523(a)(16)); see also In re Hawk, 314 B.R. at 316–17. But see In re Foster, 435 B.R. 
650, 659 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010) (doubting that “the omission of § 1328(a) in § 523(a)(16) or vice versa 
evinces a legislative intent” that assessments be dischargeable under § 1328(a)). 
22 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(5) (West 2017). 
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have legal ownership of their property until title completely transfers. Sub-
section C then explains why the courts’ hands are tied to provide relief to 
these unfortunate debtors and why congressional action is necessary. 
Section II then engages in analysis beginning with subsection A, which 
addresses whether post-petition HOA fees and assessments should be con-
sidered a “claim” under section 101(5) the Bankruptcy Code, as this will de-
termine whether these assessments are dischargeable in the first place. After 
establishing that post-petition assessments should be considered a claim, sub-
section B explores how section 523(a)(16) is currently ineffective as to serv-
ing its intended purpose of protecting HOAs. This transitions into subsection 
C which sets forth a number of mechanisms that an HOA could utilize, pro-
vided with consistent legislative support, to better protect itself in the event 
its property owner(s) are not paying the HOA’s assessments.  
Ultimately, this Comment proposes an amendment to section 523(a)(16) 
which seeks to, (1) reinstate the dischargeability of post-petition assessments 
for homeowners who do not possess the property or collect rents on it, (2) 
retract unfruitful creditor protection from a bankruptcy code intended to pro-
vide a fresh start, and (3) better incentivize lenders to contribute to property 
maintenance costs when they plan to delay foreclosure. 
I.? BACKGROUND
A.?  History of 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(16) 
Added to the Bankruptcy Code in 1994, Congress enacted section 
523(a)(16) to “resolve the split of authority . . . regarding the dischargeability 
of post-petition assessments.”23 The split consisted of three main lines of au-
thority: (1) post-petition assessments were not dischargeable because they are 
post-petition obligations that arise from a covenant that runs with ownership 
of the land,24 (2) post-petition assessments were dischargeable as part of a 
prepetition contract,25 and (3) that post-petition assessments were 
23 Adams, supra note 7, at 347. 
24 In re Rosenfeld, 23 F.3d 833, 837 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Under the Declaration, the obligation to pay 
assessments is a function of owning the land with which the covenant runs. Thus, Rosenfeld’s obligation 
to pay the assessments arose from his continued post-petition ownership of the property and not from a 
pre-petition contractual obligation.”). 
23 In re Rosteck, 899 F.2d 694, 696 (7th Cir. 1990) (“It is true that the Rostecks did not actually owe money 
to Old Willow for assessments beyond those Old Willow had assessed before their bankruptcy. But the 
condominium declaration is a contract, and by entering that contract the Rostecks agreed to pay Old Wil-
low any assessments it might levy.”). 
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dischargeable only if the debtor does not reside in or lease the unit.26 Appear-
ing to have adopted the third line of reasoning but not necessarily ruling out 
the second, the 1994 version of the Section read: 
(16) for a fee or assessment that becomes due and payable 
after the order for relief to a membership association with 
respect to the debtor’s interest in a dwelling unit that has 
condominium ownership or in a share of a cooperative hous-
ing corporation, but only if such fee or assessment is payable 
for a period during which—  
(A) the debtor physically occupied a dwelling unit in the 
condominium or cooperative project; or  
(B) the debtor rented the dwelling unit to a tenant and 
received payments from the tenant for such period, but 
nothing in this paragraph shall except from discharge the 
debt of a debtor for a membership association fee or 
pending or subsequent bankruptcy case.27
Senator Strom Thurmon shed light on what Congress sought to protect 
by stating that association members “may be unfairly burdened by increases 
in their association fees if their neighbors declare bankruptcy and receive a 
discharge of the association fees which are due in the future.”28 However, it 
is evident that Congress intended to enforce these fees only against freeriding 
members who continued to live on their property and receive all the benefits 
of ownership without paying their fair share of association fees. This is evi-
denced by the fact that assessments were still dischargeable against the debt-
ors who no longer resided on the property or received rent from it.29 This 
supports the belief that Congress did not intend to address whether HOA fees 
and assessments are a dischargeable post-petition debt, but rather imple-
mented this Section purely as a matter of public policy.30
However, HOAs were discontent with the scope of section 523(a)(16). 
For one, the 1994 version only afforded protection from the freeriding mem-
bers of condominiums and cooperatives but omitted homeowner associa-
tions. Furthermore, HOAs did not agree with the “you stay, you pay”31 policy 
26 In re Ryan, 100 B.R. 411, 416 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (“[F]or the post-petition assessments to 
be discharged, the debtor must . . . relinquish possession and other incidents of ownership of the unit in 
clear and unequivocal terms.”). 
27 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (1994). 
28 140 CONG. REC. S4526 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond) (noting 
that association members “may be unfairly burdened by increases in their association fees if their neigh-
bors declare bankruptcy and receive a discharge of the association fees which are due in the future.”). 
29 Stitzer, supra note 13, at 1399. 
30 Id. at 1413. 
31 Id. at 1415. 
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because it offered no mitigation of harm to associations whose members 
simply vacated without transferring ownership.32
Enter the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2005 (“BAPCA”). BAPCA, and its amendments to the prior Code, was an 
initiative to offer more preference to, and protection for, creditors.33 In regard 
to section 523(a)(16), Congress added homeowner associations to the list of 
creditors and excepted from discharge all post-petition HOA assessments and 
fees regardless of whether the debtor occupies the property. This much 
broader exception reads as follows: 
[F]or a fee or assessment that becomes due and payable after 
the order for relief to a membership association with respect 
to the debtor’s interest in a unit that has condominium own-
ership, in a share of a cooperative corporation, or a lot in a 
homeowners association, for as long as the debtor or the trus-
tee has a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest
in such unit, such corporation, or such lot, but nothing in this 
paragraph shall except from discharge the debt of a debtor 
for a membership association fee or assessment for a period 
arising before entry of the order for relief in a pending or 
subsequent bankruptcy case.34
Essentially, the concern underlying the 2005 amendment was the gap 
between abandonment of the property by the debtor and the time when the 
lender or HOA retakes the premises. However, Congress did not foresee 
lenders delaying foreclosure for an extended length of time. For this reason, 
the current section 523(a)(16) has come to be known as a “death-trap” for 
honest debtors seeking a fresh start.35 Critics have criticized the faulty as-
sumptions on which the amendment rests, like “vacating debtors [can] easily 
divest themselves of ownership and escape nondischargeable accruing as-
sessments.”36 Although some courts conclude that section 523(a)(16)’s lan-
guage finally “preempts any argument that postpetition fees and assessments 
should be considered prepetition obligations,”37 the fact that Congress en-
acted the amendment to serve policy goals without affirming these assertions 
certainly leaves this question open for debate. 
32 Id. at 1417. 
33 See Donald Hackney, Matthew McPherson, & Daniel Friesner, Investigating the Unintended
Consequences of the 2005 BAPCPA “Means Test” on the Bankruptcy Chapter Choice Decision, 4 J. 
ECON. BANKING & FIN. 1, 2 (2011) (“BAPCPA provides a thorough overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code, 
generally rendering the Code more creditor-friendly.”).
34 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(16) (West 2005) (emphasis added). 
35 Stitzer, supra note 13, at 1418. 
36 Id. at 1418–19. 
37 In re Ames, 447 B.R. 680, 682 n.3 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011). 
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B.? The Reality Facing Vacating Homeowners and the HOAs Left 
Behind 
A few years after the BAPCA amendment to section 523(a)(16), the 
United States was hit by the 2007-08 real estate market crash. In the wake of 
the crash, property values slumped so low that lenders frequently decided, 
“the risk and costs of foreclosures are not worth the effort.”38 This has lead 
lenders to categorically deny short sale, auction, and foreclosure requests.39
It has also lead to lenders initiating the foreclosure process but not following 
through, leaving the debtor, the vacated property, and the surrounding com-
munity in a state of limbo.40 This problem is particularly prevalent in eco-
nomically distressed areas. A 2010 Government Accountability Office report 
noted that abandoned foreclosures were concentrated in such areas and “sig-
nificantly affected those communities by contributing to crime and by de-
pressing the value of the surrounding properties.”41
Almost a decade later, the repercussions of this economic catastrophe 
are still felt. Before the mortgage crisis, home prices had steadily increased 
for fifteen years.42 In retrospect, it is understandable why Congress amended 
the section under the assumption that banks would likely choose to foreclose, 
even if at a small loss, rather than allow the property to sit vacant without 
bringing in any money. However, due to the staggering plummet in the real 
estate market, lenders are far more likely to delay the sale of foreclosed prop-
erty. After all this time, the foreclosure delaying effects of the 2007-08 crash 
are not only lingering but are on the rise.43
Even though data shows that the number of foreclosures is going down, 
in many states the time it takes to foreclose is increasing.44 In the first quarter 
of 2012 the national foreclosure timeline averaged 370 days, but in the third 
quarter of 2015 this average had risen to 629 days.45 In fact, the foreclosure 
process has increased year-over-year in twenty-eight states.46 According to 
RealtyTrac (an online marketplace for foreclosure properties and real estate 
data) the following states are infamously ranked as those with the longest 
38 Frost, supra note 18, at 1. 
39 See Better Bankruptcy, SFGATE, http://homeguides.sfgate.com/would-lender-deny-short-sale-
want-foreclosure-instead-7252.html (last visited March 24, 2017). 
40 Frost, supra note 18, at 1. 
41 Id.
42 Stitzer, supra note 13, at 1419. 
43 Loftsgordon, Foreclosure Timelines, supra note 4. 
44 Id.
45 Id.
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foreclosure process: New Jersey (as of the second quarter of 2017, the aver-
age foreclosure time in New Jersey is 1,347 days), New York (had the third-
longest foreclosure timeline, averaging 1,255 days), while Florida foreclo-
sures take around 1,203 days to complete. 
With HOA fees typically above $200, this could mean a $6,000 liability, 
or more, against a person—or family—with so little to spare.47 If Congress 
had known this would have been the case in 2005, it is not very likely it would 
have given as much favor to the creditors as it did. This is simply an example 
of legislation being rationalized upon an assumption that has been proven 
wrong. Congress likely did not have this scenario in mind three years earlier 
when it only hoped to better protect creditor rights. In fairness to Congress, 
Brandt Stitzer did state: 
Section 523(a)(16) was likely amended under the assump-
tion that lenders would continue to promptly foreclose on 
surrendered properties as they had done in the past, or that 
debtors would continue to have alternative ways to divest 
themselves of property. The combination of the mortgage 
crisis and the inability for debtors to divest themselves of 
their property has proven this assumption defective.48
Today, the reality is that transferring ownership is not a fast and easy 
process, and the debtor has absolutely no control over the timeline. Indeed, 
there were other factors lengthening the timeline apart from a lender’s deci-
sion to wait out increased property values, such as the increase of foreclo-
sures that jammed the usual flow of the foreclosure process.49 However, the 
fact that the number of foreclosures is now decreasing, while the time it takes 
to foreclose is increasing, indicates that lender-delays are currently prolong-
ing the foreclosure process. All the while the debtor is liable for the accruing 
monthly expenses of maintaining the property. The effects of the lender’s 
leverage and the lack of incentive for the lender to expedite the foreclosure 
process is harming the debtor. Moreover, the HOA and HOA community are 
also harmed by these effects as the HOA is better able to recover its assess-
ments and maintain its community when there is a solvent homeowner living 
on the property rather than an insolvent debtor who has abandoned the prop-
erty.50
47 Loftsgordon, Foreclosure Timelines, supra note 4. 
48 Stitzer, supra note 13, at 1419. 
49 In re Spencer, 457 B.R. 601, 612 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (“The confluence of economic forces has 
flooded the market [with foreclosures] and jammed the usual flow of the foreclosure process, with up-
stream effects on bankruptcy proceedings.”). 
50 Stitzer, supra note 13, at 1426 (“The combination of lender delay and lack of member equity 
has, however, rendered § 523(a)(16) of little value to associations.”). 
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State laws regarding transfer of ownership also place the debtor at a dis-
advantage. Under the law of many states, perfect title to real estate cannot be 
abandoned.51 This means that while the property is unoccupied the title owner 
is assumed to continue in possession.52 Even in a “title theory” state, where 
the mortgagee holds the borrower’s title to the property as security until all 
loan payments have been made, the borrower will always be the equitable 
owner.53 Therefore, the obligation to pay HOA fees and assessments would 
not shift to the mortgagee unless the mortgagee were to take possession.54
C.? The Bankruptcy Courts’ Inability to Provide Equitable Relief 
So far, the only burdens on the debtor that have been discussed are those 
that state law imposes. These burdens include permitting mortgagees to delay 
foreclosure and establishing the debtor as the equitable owner of property 
they have abandoned even if their lender holds title. However, in addition to 
these burdens there are little—if any—resources a debtor can turn to for re-
lief. Courtrooms around the nation are at a loss to provide any legally per-
missible assistance to debtors who find themselves paying HOA fees month 
after month to benefit a property they have completely disassociated them-
selves from.55
First of all, after the First Circuit’s decision in In re Canning, it is un-
likely that a debtor could successfully claim that a mortgagee’s refusal to 
foreclose or claim possession of the property violates the bankruptcy code’s 
discharge injunction. The discharge injunction, set out in section 524 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, “operates as an injunction against . . . an act to collect, 
recover or offset any such [discharged] debt as a personal liability of the 
debtor.”56 In Canning, the debtor filed under Chapter 7 and received a dis-
charge of the remainder of its mortgage.57 The debtor requested that the bank 
foreclose on the property or otherwise take title to the residence since the 
51 Frost, supra note 18, at 4; see, e.g., Town of Sedgwick v. Butler, 722 A.2d 357, 358 (Me. 
1998) (“perfect legal title cannot be lost by abandonment . . . .”). 
52 Frost, supra note 18, at 4. 
53 Id. at 4–5. 
54 Id. at 5. 
55 See In re Beeter, 173 B.R. 108, 113 n. 4 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (finding that factors such as aban-
donment are not relevant to determining whether post-petition assessments are a dischargeable claim); see 
also In re Courmier, 434 B.R. 222, 224 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010) (“At a time when the soaring foreclosure 
rate has left a backlog of bank-owned properties, and both owners and banks often choose to simply walk 
away—leaving abandoned homes and buildings to blight and burden their neighborhoods, cities, and 
towns—the inadequacy of existing state and federal laws to provide meaningful, responsible solutions 
becomes distressingly obvious. Yet, judges are interpreters and not architects of the law.”). 
56 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(2) (West 2005). 
57 In re Canning, 706 F.3d 64, 66 (1st Cir. 2013). 
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debtor was still obligated to pay taxes, insurance, and maintenance expenses 
for the property.58 When the bank refused the debtor’s request, the debtor 
filed for a adversary proceeding claiming that the bank was in violation of 
the discharge injunction and sought an order requiring the bank to either take 
possession of the property or to deliver unencumbered title to the debtors.59
The plaintiff’s theory was that the bank was attempting to extract pay-
ment of a discharged debt (i.e., the remaining mortgage) by using the debtor’s 
liability as an “equitable owner” as leverage.60 In support of this theory the 
plaintiff relied primarily on In re Pratt.61 In Pratt, the same court held that a 
secured creditor’s posture in conditioning release of its lien on full payment 
of the loan balance amounted to a reaffirmation of debt demand that contra-
vened “the stringent ‘anti-coercion’ requirements of [the] Bankruptcy Code 
. . . .”62
However, the First Circuit Court of Appeals noted key distinctions be-
tween the facts of Canning and Pratt. First, the court noted the difference in 
the secured creditors’ postures. In Pratt, the secured creditor refused to re-
possess and conditioned release of its lien upon full payment of the loan bal-
ance.63 The creditor rested its refusal on its state-law in rem right to enforce 
its lien against the vehicle even after discharge of Pratt’s unsecured liability 
on the loan.64 However, the court reasoned that state law rights are not a de-
fense to violating the discharge injunction if the rights are being asserted to 
coerce payment of a discharged debt.65 By contrast, in Canning, the secured 
creditor did not require the debtor to pay in full, but rather offered the oppor-
tunity for a voluntary settlement or a short sale.66 This indicated to the court 
that the bank had no interest in coercing full payment of the discharged debt 
and sought to collect no more than the value securing its lien.67
Secondly, the court marked the differences in the collateral that the debt-
ors sought to relinquish in the two cases. In Pratt, the property at issue was a 
car.68 This was a critical component of the Pratt holding because unlike real 
estate, “vehicles rarely appreciate over time.”69 According to the Bankruptcy 
58 Id. at 67. 
59 Id.
60 Id. at 72. 
61 Id. at 67–68. 
62 In re Pratt, 462 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2006). 
63 Id. at 15. 
64 Id. at 16. 
65 Id. at 19. 
66 In re Canning, 706 F.3d 64, 67 (1st Cir. 2013). 
67 Id. at 68. 
68 In re Pratt, 462 F.3d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 2006). 
69 Id. at 20. 
39895-fiu_13-1 sym
posium
 Sheet No. 90 Side A      09/13/2018   14:52:31
39895-fiu_13-1 symposium Sheet No. 90 Side A      09/13/2018   14:52:31
C M
Y K
2018-08-02 MURRAY FINAL(WINDOWS).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/30/18 12:37 PM 
2018] Bad Rules Won’t Clean Dirty Pools 173 
Appellate Panel in Canning as well as the First Circuit Court of Appeals, real 
estate’s ability to increase in value over time provides a compelling reason 
for creditors to insist on their state law right to retain liens and refuse repos-
session.70 This was not the outcome in Pratt because the car was deemed 
worthless and the creditor was demanding to be paid in full.71
It is unclear if the result in Canning would have been different if the 
mortgagee had not provided the options of negotiation or short sale to the 
debtor. However, it is entirely possible that real estate’s ability to appreciate 
in value alone is sufficient to establish that any refusal by a lender to deliver 
unencumbered title is free of any coercion that would be deemed to violate 
the discharge injunction. This means that a debtor HOA member who wishes 
to require its lender to foreclose on the debtor’s property in order to relieve 
the debtor of accruing assessments will not likely have an action against the 
refusing lender for violation of the discharge injunction. 
Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Code itself, despite its fresh start policy, 
does not offer any clear recourse for a debtor affected by section 523(a)(16). 
Although debtors have the option under sections 521 and 1325 of the Code 
to “surrender” their property,72 judicial interpretation of these provisions hold 
that a debtor who surrenders is simply agreeing to make the collateral avail-
able to the secured creditor and will not oppose transfer of the collateral.73
However, in no way does surrendering the property require the creditor to 
take possession or foreclose on the property.74 Moreover, courts do not have 
the authority to compel acceptance of the surrendered property.75 Although 
many courts have expressed disapproval with the debtor being subject to the 
lender’s will and having no mechanism to avoid accumulating assessments 
attached to an encumbered property,76 courts must act as “interpreters and not 
architects of the law.” 77
70 In re Canning, 706 F.3d at 72. 
71 In re Pratt, 462 F.3d at 20. 
72 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 521 (West 2017); see also 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325 (West 2017). 
73 In re Spencer, 457 B.R. 601, 612 (E.D. Mich. 2011). 
74 In re Service, 155 B.R. 512, 514 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (“Debtors may not compel this creditor to 
accept surrender nor enforce its rights and take title to the realty.”). 
75 Id.
76 See In re Beeter, 173 B.R. 108, 113 n. 4 (W.D. Tex. 1994); see also In re Courmier, 434 B.R. 
222, 224 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010). 
77 In re Courmier, 434 B.R. at 224. 
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II.? ANALYSIS
A.? Post-petition Assessments are a “Claim” under Section 101(5) of 
the Bankruptcy Code 
The Bankruptcy Code section 101(5) defines a “claim” as: 
A right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to 
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, ma-
tured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, se-
cured, or unsecured; or 
A right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if 
such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not 
such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, 
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undis-
puted, secured, or unsecured.78
Initially, some have argued that post-petition HOA fees and assessments 
are not prepetition claims within the Code definition of “claim,” and there-
fore, regardless of section 523(a)(16), a debtor cannot discharge such obliga-
tions in bankruptcy.79 Therefore, the analysis begins with first establishing 
that post-petition assessments do in fact fit into the Code’s definition of 
“claim” or, at least, that this is what Congress intended. 
The primary argument that HOA assessments are not within the Code’s 
meaning of “claim” is that an HOA’s right to performance is based on a non-
dischargeable equitable servitude rather than a contingent right to payment.80
In other words, the obligation to pay assessments do not arise from a prepe-
tition contract, but from a covenant running with the land.81 This means that 
the debtor’s obligation to the HOA arises from a property interest given by 
each party, which lasts until legal title is transferred.82 The effect of this is 
that discharging debt tied to property rights would invest a greater property 
interest in the debtor than it had prior to filing for bankruptcy, which is not 
the Code’s goal.83 As one author observes, “The distinction between secured 
78  11 U.S.C.A. 101(5) (West 2017). 
79 Ricotta, supra note 10. 
80 Id. at 195. 
81 Id. at 188. 
82 Stitzer, supra note 13, at 1409. 
83 See Cen-Pen Corp. v. Hanson, 58 F.3d 89, 93 (4th Cir. 1995) (“The simple expedient of passing 
their residence through the bankruptcy estate could not vest in the [debtors] a greater interest in the resi-
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claims against debtors’ real property and claims against debtors individually, 
and the ability to separate them, is crucial to this theory.”84
The Supreme Court weighed in on this distinction in Johnson v. Home 
State Bank. This case sets forth the question of whether a debtor, who filed 
for liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, could be discharged 
from his mortgage liability.85 The Court held that a mortgage lien securing 
an obligation is a “claim” within the meaning of section 101(5) since Con-
gress intended section 101(5) to incorporate the broadest definition of 
“claim.”86 Furthermore, the Court stated that “right to payment” means 
“nothing more nor less than an enforceable obligation.”87
Notably, the Supreme Court defines a mortgage as an interest in real 
property that secures creditor’s right to payment.88 However, the Court did 
not hold that the complete property right is discharged, just the debtor’s ob-
ligation under it.89 As the Court noted, this leaves the creditor with a surviv-
ing right to retain proceeds from the sale or foreclosure of the debtor’s prop-
erty.90 The Court states, “[t]hus, a bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only 
one mode of enforcing a claim—an in personam action—while leaving intact 
another—an in rem action.”91 Although this would appear to support the no-
tion that personal rights and property rights arising from HOA assessment 
obligations are similarly severable, there is still a key distinction between a 
mortgage and HOA assessments. If an HOA assessment is in fact a covenant 
that runs with the land, the assessment would be an integral part of the prop-
erty which became a personal liability when the debtor acquired title to the 
property. This differs from the in personam liability on a mortgage which is 
acquired by a debtor as a matter of contract.92
Perhaps more indicative of Congress’ view on the issue is what Con-
gress believed at the time it made post-petition HOA assessments nondis-
chargeable. Based on congressional commentary and the language of the stat-
ute itself, it seems unlikely that Congress takes the stance that assessments 
accruing after discharge are not otherwise dischargeable. As noted above, 
Congress indicated that it sought to protect associations from the burden of 
84 Stitzer, supra note 13, at 1408. 
85 Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991). 
86 Id. at 83. 
87 Id. at 78. 
88 Id. at 82. 
89 Id. at 78. 
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 In re Rivera, 256 B.R. 828, 833-34 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000); see also In re Hall, 454 B.R. 230, 
241 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011) (distinguishing a covenant to pay assessments from a mortgage).  
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assessment default.93 Thus, even in light of the then prevailing argument that 
these obligations were an integral property right that could not be discharged, 
Congress focused on the policy reasons for justifying the 2005 amendment 
and completely ignored the proposition that HOA assessments are covenants 
that run with the land. This suggests that Congress has considered post-peti-
tion HOA assessments to be a right to payment covered by the Code’s defi-
nition of “claim” all along and that section 523(a)(16) was necessary for Con-
gress to protect HOAs from the discharge of this post-petition debt. 
Furthermore, the fact that an HOA assessment may be a covenant run-
ning with the land is not dispositive as to whether it creates a right to payment 
dischargeable under section 101(5). Even if an HOA’s right to payment is 
based on an equitable servitude, it is still may be “a right to payment” con-
templated by Congress when it drafted the definition of claim under the Code. 
The legislative history of section 101(5) indicates that Congress intended “to 
provide the broadest possible definition of claim.”94 Furthermore, Congress 
contemplated that “all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote 
or contingent will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case.”95
Even without this piece of legislative history, the language itself is clear 
that Congress contemplated equitable rights to payment to be dischargeable. 
Again, claim is defined as “a right to payment, whether or not such right is 
. . . equitable; or a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if 
such breach gives right to payment.”96 Nonetheless, critics press forward that 
HOA fees are not a right to payment, but rather a property interest, based on 
the equitable servitude theory.97 The idea here is that because the debtor’s in 
personam right cannot be separated from the creditor’s in rem right without 
vesting the debtor with a greater property interest, equitable servitudes are 
per se nondischargeable. However, there is an argument to be made that when 
an HOA’s only interest is in receiving monetary payment then the debtor’s 
obligation to pay that debt is dischargeable.98 First, consider the following 
assertion: 
There are several misconceptions about discharging HOA 
dues that are common among both homeowners and 
93 140 CONG. REC. S4526 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond) (noting 
that association members “may be unfairly burdened by increases in their association fees if their neigh-
bors declare bankruptcy and receive a discharge of the association fees which are due in the future.”). 
94 Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 83 (1991). 
95 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 22 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5808; see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 95-595, at 309 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266. 
96 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(5) (West 2017). 
97 Ricotta, supra note 10. 
98 See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985) (holding that the bankruptcy code does not require a 
claim to arise from a contractual arrangement). 
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attorneys. It is commonly thought that HOA dues run with 
land, and are not dischargeable in bankruptcy . . . These mis-
understandings can be resolved when it is understood that 
the assessments are not the same thing as the covenants. The 
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) contain a 
covenant that is a promise to pay the assessments each month 
they become due. This covenant to pay the assessments is a 
separate and distinct thing from the actual assessment, which 
is the dollar amount of fees imposed each month. The cove-
nant in the CC&Rs runs with the land and can never be re-
moved, but the assessments are regular debts that can be dis-
charged in bankruptcy under a certain set of rules. The truth 
is that past due HOA arrears are dischargeable in most 
cases.99
Secondly, in Ohio v. Kovacs, the Supreme Court made clear that the 
bankruptcy code does not require a claim to arise out of a contractual agree-
ment.100 In that case, the debtor’s obligation arose from a statutory violation, 
which lead to a court order requiring the debtor to perform environmental 
cleanup.101 However, the Court found that Ohio indicated that it was only 
interested in “a money payment to effectuate . . . cleanup.”102 Because the 
liability was based on a monetary payment, the Court ruled that the right to 
payment was dischargeable in bankruptcy.103 Based on this ruling, it would 
seem that liability based on a right to monetary payment—even if it arises 
from a property interest—should be considered a claim in bankruptcy.  
This ruling is distinguishable from lower court rulings, which state that 
just because a debtor has to spend money to comply with a court order does 
not necessarily create a dischargeable claim.104 For example, in Hubler, a 
district court case affirmed by the Third Circuit, the court addressed the issue 
of whether an equitable order requiring a party to engage in affirmative acts 
to clean up the environment gives rise to a “right to payment” that can be 
considered a claim under the Bankruptcy Code.105 The district court’s inter-
pretation of Kovacs was that its holding is limited to situations where a 
99 Andrew Christensen, Can I Discharge My Home Owner Association Dues in Bankruptcy?,
CLINE LAW GRP., https://www.clinelawgroup.com/debts/can-i-discharge-my-home-owner-association-
dues-in-bankruptcy/. 
100 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 275. 
101 Id. at 276. 
102 Id. at 281. 
103 Id. at 274. 
104 See United States v. Hubler, 117 B.R. 160 (W.D. Penn. 1990), aff’d, 928 F.2d 1131 (3rd Cir. 
1991). 
105 Id. at 163. 
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cleanup order is “converted into an obligation to pay money.”106 This led the 
court to hold that equitable court orders, which demand performance and 
which cannot be satisfied by making a monetary payment, are not discharge-
able in bankruptcy.107
The Hubler holding does not affect the issue at hand. When it comes to 
HOA fees and assessments, the sole interest is in monetary payment. Unlike 
an obligation to perform a task, which may require the ancillary spending of 
money, HOA assessments create an immediate right to payment where mon-
etary payment is the only way to satisfy the obligation. Therefore, the possi-
bility that an HOA’s right to receive payment of its assessment and fees may 
be based in a property interest is less significant. It is the HOA’s “right to 
payment” that creates a claim under the Bankruptcy Code, not where the right 
comes from.108 This Comment does not overlook the fact that violating a stat-
ute, as was the case in Kovacs, does not implicate the same rights as violating 
a covenant running with the land. However, the overarching opinion of this 
section is that the actual monetary assessment charged against the debtor is 
separate from the debtor’s promise to pay the assessment each month it be-
comes due.109
Finally, the language of section 523(a)(16) makes clear that Congress 
views HOA assessments as a “debt.” In pertinent part section 523(a)(16) 
states: “[B]ut nothing in this paragraph shall except from discharge the debt 
of a debtor for a membership association fee or assessment for a period aris-
ing before entry of the order for relief in a pending or subsequent bankruptcy 
case.” 110 This is significant because the Bankruptcy Code defines “debt” as 
“liability on a claim,”111 within the same section of the Code where Congress 
defines claim. Accordingly, the debt described in section 523(a)(16) is a 
claim by definition. 
Therefore, because (1) the actual assessments are a regular debt that cre-
ates a “right to payment”; (2) Congress intended the scope of section 101(5) 
to be read as broadly as possible; (3) prepetition HOA assessments are dis-
chargeable; and (4) Congress describes HOA assessments as a debt, which 
by definition makes the assessment a liability based on a claim, it is evident 
that Congress would recognize that HOA assessments are not a nondis-
chargeable claim in the absence of section 523(a)(16). Thus, the only road-
block to the dischargeability of HOA assessments is section 523(a)(16) itself. 
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(5) (West 2017). 
109 See Christensen, supra note 99. 
110 11 U.S.C.A § 523(a)(16) (West 2017). 
111 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(12) (West 2017). 
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B.? Bad Rules Don’t Clean Dirty Pools: Why Section 523(a)(16) Does 
Not Actually Protect HOAs 
Because Congress amended section 523(a)(16) in order to protect HOAs 
rather than to declare HOA assessments per se nondischargeable, it must now 
be considered whether section 523(a)(16) actually serves its intended pur-
pose. If Congress assumed that the debtor would be able to resort to self-help 
strategies to pay off the accumulating assessments, it was wrong. As dis-
cussed, courts cannot force lender foreclosure and debtors cannot assert vio-
lation of the discharge injunction against lenders.112 Therefore, an insolvent 
debtor may have significant difficulty coming up with the means to pay the 
accruing assessments for an extended period.  
A similarly erroneous assumption is that debtors will actually make 
good on their HOA fees and assessments simply because they are deemed 
nondischargeable. This is not to say that exceptions to discharge are inher-
ently worthless. However, section 523(a)(16) does present an atypical debt 
scenario. Unlike many of the prepetition debts excepted from discharge 
throughout section 523, whether it be for recovery of priority payments or 
the debtor’s bad behavior, section 523(a)(16) refers to an accumulating post-
petition debt.113 This means that each month will carry with it a new debt 
balance arising from an interest in property that the debtor-owner does not 
presently possess. It is not difficult to see why in most cases it is not likely 
that the insolvent debtor will have the ability or will to pay off each monthly 
balance pertaining to the abandoned property. 
Moreover, depending on state law and the priority provisions in the 
HOA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, the HOA may not be enti-
tled to priority payments and may find itself last in a long line of secured 
creditors. For example, Florida statute Section 720.3085 states that a lien to 
secure payment of HOA assessments shall relate back to the date on which 
the original declaration of the community was recorded.114 Therefore, as to 
all creditors besides first mortgagees, a secured interest formed after the HOA 
recorded its original declaration will be subordinate to the HOA’s interest 
unless federal or state law sets forth otherwise. However, not all states pro-
vide such lien status. California law, for example, states that an HOA lien 
shall be prior to all other liens recorded subsequent to the notice of delinquent 
assessment.115 This means that an HOA lien is subject to the standard priority 
112 See In re Canning, 706 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir. 2013). 
113 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(16) (West 2017). 
114 FLA. STAT. § 720.3085 (2015). 
115 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 5680 (West 2014). 
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rule that liens are prioritized by the date they are filed rather than the date the 
HOA executed its declaration.116
Considering the above factors, section 523(a)(16) does not offer neces-
sary protection for the HOA as much as it creates a nuisance for the debtor 
homeowner. In reality, section 523(a)(16) is more of a windfall for HOAs 
than a necessary provision to ensure recovery of default assessments. Any 
well counseled HOA would know that, in most circumstances, engaging in 
time consuming litigation against an insolvent debtor is far less efficient than 
placing a lien on the property and foreclosing on it. Depending on the HOAs 
priority in relation to the first mortgage, the latter course of action would 
allow the HOA to sell or at least rent the property after it retakes it in fore-
closure.117 However, section 523(a)(16) exposes the debtor to potential action 
that would allow the HOA to sue a homeowner, who is not in possession of 
the property, and then garnish that homeowner’s wages or bank accounts, 
even if the association additionally pursues lien foreclosure.118
Amending section 523(a)(16) will thus tailor an HOA’s available re-
course without impeding on its ability to recover lost payment. It is important 
that the law encourages HOAs to explore alternative and more efficient 
courses to payment, which will also eliminate reoccurring assessments 
against a bankrupt debtor not in possession of the encumbered property.  
The rest of this Comment will explore the available courses of action an 
HOA may take to recover for its lost assessments and how section 523(a)(16) 
should be amended to impose a lessor burden on debtors at as little a cost as 
possible to HOAs. This will begin with an analysis of lien priority status, a 
solution proffered by some legal scholars that calls for careful consideration. 
1.? Is lien priority the right solution? 
It has been proposed that the solution to an HOA’s priority problem, 
which usually subordinates an HOA lien to the first mortgage, is for HOAs 
to establish lien priority within their Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions 
116 See Christensen, supra note 99. 
117 Jonathan M. Mofsky, Important Ruling for Associations Seeking to Foreclose in Advance of 
Lenders, DAILY BUS. REVIEW, http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/home/id=1202767742325/Im-
portant-Ruling-for-Lenders/ (“By filing and quickly prosecuting separate foreclosure actions based on 
liens for unpaid assessments, associations have been able to acquire and rent properties embroiled in pro-
longed mortgage foreclosure proceedings.”). 
118 Jill Mazirow Eshman, What’s A Homeowners’ Association To Do? Collecting Dues and As-
sessments During Difficult Financial Times, 53 ADVOC. 33, 34 (2010) (stating “[a]t the same time as the 
association pursues the statutory lien foreclosure, the association may pursue a money judgment, presum-
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(CC&Rs).119 As previously discussed, state law is one method of determining 
lien priority. However, because most state statutes state that an HOA lien 
shall relate back to the date it recorded its CC&R,120 the HOA has the ability 
to establish senior priority through its CC&R even as to a first mortgage.121
This means that the HOA could foreclose with the same rights that a bank 
would normally have and sell the property retaining all of the proceeds. 
HOA lien priority certainly seems to be an appealing mechanism for 
offering HOAs better protection and the ability to find due-paying buyers that 
will relieve both the HOA and the previous debtor. However, this solution 
does not come without its drawbacks. For example, trumping the lender’s 
lien will lead to lender’s charging higher rates or refusing to lend at all to 
prospective buyers of property within the HOA community.122 Not only 
would this make it more difficult for the HOA to find due-paying buyers, it 
would also affect the HOAs property owners who would have more difficulty 
selling their property.123 For these reasons CC&Rs will often contain a pro-
vision that any HOA lien is subordinate to a first mortgage. 
Although an HOA may have strong fiscal reasons to subordinate its lien, 
the fact that most states permit HOAs to protect themselves through senior 
lien priority raises the question of whether HOAs are truly in need of section 
523(a)(16) as amended. Furthermore, even without priority lien status, an 
HOA still has sufficient recourse as a junior lien holder to weigh against its 
case for keeping the discharge exception as is. With that said, the point of 
this Comment is not to accuse section 523(a)(16) of offering HOAs too much 
protection that should be curtailed to maintain bankruptcy policy. Instead, the 
Comment seeks to strike a better balance between the complex rights of the 
pertinent parties to this important property issue. The following two sections 
describe potential mechanisms that state and federal law could strive to pro-
mote in order to lay the groundwork for amending section 523(a)(16) as later 
proposed. 
119 Stitzer, supra note 13, at 1431. 
120 Amy Loftsgordon, Homeowners Association Super Liens, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/homeowners-association-super-liens.html (last visited March 24, 2017) (“The lien will typ-
ically automatically attach to that homeowner’s property, commonly as of the date the HOA’s Declaration 
of Covenants.”). 
121 Stitzer, supra note 13, at 1428. 
122 Id.
123 Homeowners and Condominium Associations Should Not Be Granted “Super Lien” Priority,
MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, https://www.mba.org/issues/residential-issues/hoa-super-lien-priority [herein-
after Mortgage Bankers Association] (last visited March 25, 2017). 
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2.? Super liens  
The financial struggles of homeowner and condominium associations 
prompted calls to strengthen the associations’ power to collect delinquent as-
sessments.124 This led to many states enacting what are known as “super-lien 
statutes” to elevate an association’s lien to a limited senior priority over the 
first mortgage.125 The majority of states mirror their statutory language to the 
Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (“UCIOA”) and the Uniform Con-
dominium Act (“UCA”), which provide for a common assessment super-
lien.126 The Uniform Acts provide that an association’s lien will receive sen-
iority for six months’ worth of delinquent assessments based on the associa-
tion’s periodic budget.127 This creates a split priority in relation to the first 
mortgage, which differentiates super liens from the priority liens discussed 
in the previous section. In his Annual Review of Banking Law, Grahame 
Wells states that “[b]y giving the condo association a limited priority over 
the first mortgagee, the super-lien statute divides the burden of collecting 
long-term delinquent condo fees between the lenders and condo associa-
tions.”128 These same principles can apply to the various associations listed 
in section 523(a)(16). 
States planning to enact super-lien statutes will have to consider the re-
deemability of the super-lien. Redeemability refers to whether the HOA will 
receive a one-time senior priority, or if the HOA can regain senior priority 
over all future assessment delinquencies. As Wells clarifies: 
With a redeemable super-priority lien, the condo association receives a 
one-time senior priority for delinquent fees; once the first mortgagee pays off 
this senior portion, the condo association cannot return to the senior position. 
With a redeemable super-priority lien, the first mortgagee could, by redeem-
ing only the priority portion of the lien upon default, receive priority over all 
future assessment delinquencies. The lender regains senior priority even if 
the amount it pays to the condo association does not discharge the entire as-
sessment delinquency. Conversely, under a non-redeemable super-priority 
lien, the first mortgagee can return to senior priority only after redeeming the 
entire delinquent assessment. For instance, if the unit owner was in default 
for nine months of assessments, six months would be senior to the mortgage 
124 Grahame K. Wells, The Use of Super-Liens to Promote Cooperation Between Condominium 
Associations and Lenders, 13 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 477, 478 (1994). 
125 Id. at 484 (“Legislatures in Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Nevada, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, Washington, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia have enacted condominium 
statutes that include a super-lien provision.”). 
126 Id.
127 Id. at 490. 
128 Id. at 489. 
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and three months junior. If the lender paid off the six months of assessments, 
the remaining three months of delinquencies would then receive the senior 
priority. Even if the lender paid the entire nine months of delinquent fees to 
the condo association, future condo fee deficiencies would still receive senior 
priority over the first mortgage.129
Based on the existing super-lien statutes, two models are suggested: the 
Massachusetts model and the Uniform model.130 The Massachusetts model 
varies from the Uniform model’s non-redeemable approach by allowing the 
lenders to extinguish the senior priority portion of the lien by paying off the 
six months of delinquent fees. Additionally, the Massachusetts model calls 
for attorneys’ fees and a notice requirement, neither of which are included in 
the Uniform model. 
Wells argues that inclusion of attorneys’ fees will encourage lenders to 
cure the deficiency quickly, before an association has spent money trying to 
collect the assessment. 131 Without such attorneys’ fee provisions it is likely 
that an HOA would not receive a refund from the lender until the lender fore-
closes. Moreover, the notice provision requires HOAs to keep lenders aware 
of non-payments, prompting better communication between HOAs and lend-
ers. Finally, allowing lenders to redeem their senior priority will make it eas-
ier for lenders to adequately secure HOA loans and will incentivize lenders 
to compensate HOAs more quickly.  
3.? HOA foreclosure with junior lien status 
However, some believe that super liens lead to the same concerns that 
priority liens do in terms of increasing the risk of originating and servicing 
loans in HOA communities.132 The good news is, even with junior lien status, 
HOAs are not powerless to collect their assessments. At least some appellate 
courts have recognized an HOA’s right to foreclose on delinquent assessment 
liens even during a lender foreclosure where the lender filed a lis pendens.133
 In Florida, a recent ruling by the Fourth District Court of Appeal con-
firmed this.134 The case involved a prolonged mortgage foreclosure action 
against the homeowner, which began in 2007.135 The first mortgagee filed a 
129 Id. at 492. 
130 Id.
131 Id. at 497. 
132 Mortgage Bankers Association, supra note 123. 
133 See Jallali v. Knightsbridge Vill. Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 211 So. 3d 216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2017). 
134 Id.
135 Id. at 217. 
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notice of lis pendens, in conjunction with its foreclosure action.136 A lis pen-
dens serves two main purposes: (1) to give notice to and thereby protect any 
future purchases or encumbrances of the property; and (2) to protect the 
plaintiff from intervening liens.137 Subsequently, the HOA recorded a lien for 
delinquent assessments against the homeowner and commenced its own fore-
closure proceedings in 2012.138 The court found that a homeowner associa-
tion’s declaration of covenants, recorded not only prior to the filing of a no-
tice of lis pendens by the first mortgagee may constitute a prior recorded 
interest within the meaning of the lis pendens statute. The court’s reasoning 
was that a HOA’s CC&R constitutes an “interest” in property under section 
48.23(1)(d) of Florida Statutes.139 The court then clearly states, “the filing of 
a lis pendens does not automatically preclude an association from foreclosing 
on a lien imposed under the declaration against parties other than a first mort-
gagee, although the association’s foreclosure may be subordinate to the fore-
closure of a first mortgage.”140
The real advantage is that once the HOA forecloses it can retake the 
property and collect rent on it. Although the lender’s lien will remain on the 
property, the HOA would not be obliged to pay it since the parties are not in 
privity of contract.141 Naturally, the bank will want to avoid losing the prop-
erty and may pay out the lien in order to avoid foreclosure. Even if the bank 
does not redeem the property, taking ownership away from the lender without 
obligation to pay the mortgage would force the lender’s hand into foreclosure 
in order to collect on its own lien. In the meantime, the HOA might rent out 
the home on a short-term basis until the first mortgage holder’s foreclosure 
is complete . In doing so the HOA would accrue monthly income and could 
keep the proceeds.142 In cases where the lender’s claim is large and the prop-
erty’s value is not sufficient to induce the lender to foreclose, the HOA will 
have more time to collect rent. However, if the lender decides to foreclose 
right away, the HOA can still collect rent throughout the foreclosure process 
until the property is sold and a due-paying buyer moves in. In either case, the 
HOA is the recipient of cash flow covering the post-petition assessments, 
which justifies not keeping the debtor homeowner on the hook for such debt. 
One drawback to junior lien foreclosure is that, in many states, an HOA 
would become subject to paying maintenance, taxes, and insurance on the 
136 Id.
137 Id. at 218. 
138 Id. at 217. 
139 FLA. STAT. § 48.23(1)(d) (2017) (stating that a notice of lis pendens does not affect a previously 
recorded interest or lien). 
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property.143 Often, HOA’s are reluctant to take such responsibility at the risk 
that the superior lien holder forecloses before the property can be leased long 
enough to cover the foreclosure costs. However, these concerns do not apply 
in the case of a bankrupt homeowner. When an HOA forecloses against an 
insolvent homeowner, the HOA would prefer a quick foreclosure process that 
places a new due-paying member on the property. However, in the event of 
a delayed foreclosure, the HOA can take comfort in its ability to collect rent 
until a new member purchases the home from the bank.144 Meanwhile, the 
bankrupt homeowner is relieved from its assessment obligations and can en-
joy a fresh start. 
4.? Changes required in state law to facilitate efficient assessment 
lien foreclosure 
Because this Comment urges an amendment to the federal Bankruptcy 
Code, rationalized upon the view that assessment lien foreclosure offers 
HOAs a sufficient course to payment, the Comment must also urge uni-
formity across state laws that will allow all HOAs to recover equally. This is 
currently not the case because the foreclosure process varies from state to 
state. Therefore, HOAs in one state may be entitled to quick and inexpensive 
foreclosure proceedings, while an HOA in another state may incur attorneys’ 
fees that exceed the amount of default assessments.
Admittedly, one problem with suggesting foreclosure as a mechanism 
for recovering default assessments is that the foreclosure process can be quite 
expensive, especially if judicial foreclosure is required under state law. For 
example, Florida and nineteen other states require judicial foreclosure.145
This process was illustrated in the above-captioned case, Jallali, where the 
association had to bring an action against the property owner in order to fore-
close on its assessment lien.146 Judicial foreclosure requires the creditor to 
file a lawsuit in state court and typically takes several months, or even years 
to complete.147
143 Gerri Detweiler, Property Taxes After Foreclosure: Who Pays?, AOL (August 7, 2013, 2:00 
PM), https://www.aol.com/article/2013/08/07/property-taxes-after-foreclosure-who-pays/20689156/ 
(“The liability follows the property, not the owner.”). 
144 Collecting HOA Assessments from Banks, HOALEADER, https://www.hoaleader.com/pub-
lic/Collecting-HOA-Assessments-from-Banks-Discussion-Forum-Followup.cfm (last visited March 25, 
2017) (“[T]he HOA forecloses on its lien, rents out the home, and keeps the proceeds in a separate ac-
count.”). 
145 Foreclosure Laws and Procedures By State, REALTYTRAC, http://www.realtytrac.com/real-
estate-guides/foreclosure-laws/ (last visited March 25, 2017). 
146 Jallali, 211 So. 3d at 217. 
147 Amy Loftsgordon, What is Judicial Foreclosure?, ALLLAW,  http://www.alllaw.com/arti-
cles/nolo/foreclosure/judicial-foreclosure.html (last visited March 25, 2017). 
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In order to judicially foreclose an assessment lien, an HOA must file a 
lawsuit against the delinquent homeowner and obtain a judgment against 
such homeowner that: (1) establishes the amount owed to the HOA; and (2) 
orders the HOA’s assessment lien be foreclosed on such homeowner’s prop-
erty to satisfy the amount awarded to the HOA that is found to be secured by 
its assessment lien.148 This is a very timely and costly process.149 A lawsuit, 
if contested, can take more than a year to go to trial, notwithstanding a pos-
sible appeal.150 Therefore, the attorneys’ fees incurred can be significant. 
Even if the court awards to the HOA all of the attorneys’ fees, it is possible 
that the foreclosure proceeds cover the added fees.151
Although a judicial foreclosure offers the advantage of being able to 
create a “judgment lien,” this type of lien is not worth much to an HOA fore-
closing against an insolvent debtor. Therefore, non-judicial foreclosure may 
be a more attractive option in the type of situation discussed in this Comment. 
Non-judicial foreclosure is faster and less expensive than its judicial counter-
part. In a non-judicial foreclosure the HOA or appointed trustee would first 
provide notice of default with a limited time to cure.152 Upon failure to cure, 
a foreclosure sale will be set and the HOA or trustee will commence to pre-
pare a notice of sale.153 The notice of sale gives the date, time, and location 
of the foreclosure sale and is typically recorded in county records, mailed to 
the homeowner, and published in newspapers.154 It is at the actual foreclosure 
sale where the property may revert back to the foreclosing party if not sold 
to a third-party. 155 The disadvantage of conducting a non-judicial foreclosure 
is that it may possibly subject the HOA to a wrongful foreclosure lawsuit if 
not properly conducted.156 However, if properly conducted the non-judicial 
foreclosure can save the HOA a lot of time and money. 
The majority of states allow lenders to choose between judicial and non-
judicial foreclosure proceedings.157 However, this is not the case for the 
nearly twenty states that require judicial foreclosure. Therefore, the minority 
of states should consider adopting a non-judicial foreclosure option for 
148 GREGORY S. CAGLE, HOA ASSESSMENT LIENS 13 (2010), https://ssjmlaw.com/wp-content/up-
loads/2012/05/2010-Advanced-Real-Estate-Law-Article-HOA-Assessment-Lien-Foreclosure.pdf 
149 Id. at 14. 
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Amy Loftsgordon, What is Nonjudicial Foreclosure?, ALLLAW, http://www.alllaw.com/arti-




156 CAGLE, supra note 148. 
157 Foreclosure Laws and Procedures By State, supra note 145. 
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HOAs, including condominium associations, and any other entity that may 
be affected by an amendment to section 523(a)(16). This means that legisla-
tion pertaining to the HOA foreclosure process shall authorize HOAs to fore-
close their assessment liens by non-judicial foreclosure if expressly author-
ized to do so by their CC&R or by state law.  
C.? Justifying an Amendment to Section 523(a)(16) 
At this point, the Comment has described, in depth, some of the false 
assumptions that the 2005 amendment to section 523(a)(16) were based on. 
One assumption proven false is that the foreclosure process is not often de-
layed. Statistics reveal that lender foreclosures can take years,158 and are often 
intentionally delayed by lenders lying in wait for an increase in property val-
ues.159 Another assumption challenged throughout is that protecting an 
HOA’s interests requires keeping the debtor on the hook for post-petition as-
sessments. However, the Comment has so far explored a number of ways an 
HOA may prioritize its lien and recover losses without pursuing legal action 
against an insolvent debtor. Now the Comment must address its proposed 
amendment for section 523(a)(16) of the federal Bankruptcy Code. 
The first goal of the amendment must be to incentivize lenders to 
promptly foreclose or take possession rather than indefinitely remaining idle 
while the debtor or HOA bear expenses that directly inure to the lender’s 
benefit. Presently, section 523(a)(16) imposes accruing debt solely upon the 
debtor without considering how to leverage the interests of other parties with 
rights in the property to better serve bankruptcy’s “fresh start” policy. In re-
gards to this inequitable benefit one court states: 
The bank is the unintended beneficiary of the perfect storm of natural 
disaster and this legislative inequity. While the HOA fees continue to accrue 
against the debtor the bank is de-incentivized to take any action. The eco-
nomics of the situation allow the bank to sit idle and not foreclose as long as 
the debtor, not the bank is liable for the HOA fees. As both [the association] 
and the Bank admitted the Bank receives the benefit of the HOA services 
such as landscaping improvements, common area maintenance, signage, and 
security. Meanwhile the debtor who does not even live in the flooded condo-
minium and has tried valiantly to handle her financial crises caused by the 
flood receives minimal if any benefit for fees she must pay.160
158 See Loftsgordon, Foreclosure Timelines, supra note 4. 
159 Adams, supra note 7, at 349 (“‘With the real estate collapse, lenders, who otherwise have the 
right to do so, are choosing not to foreclose on their collateral[,] leaving homeowners in limbo.’”) (quoting 
In re Pigg, 453 B.R. 728, 733 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011)). 
160 In re Pigg, 453 B.R. at 732 n.5. 
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The first step to incentivizing lenders to promptly foreclose is to amend 
section 523(a)(16). The 1994 version aimed to prevent freeriding members 
but left HOAs to otherwise pick up the slack. The 2005 version aimed to 
better protect creditors but instead created freeriding lenders and did not ac-
complish what it intended to in terms of securing payment for HOAs. There-
fore, there has not yet been a version of this section that has struck an equi-
table balance between the debtor-member’s right to a fresh start, the HOA’s 
right to payment of its assessments and fees, and the lender’s right to wait for 
an advantageous market.  
Of course, the reality is that simply allowing full discharge of a home-
owner’s HOA debts will not serve HOAs well. Ideally, completely discharg-
ing the debtor’s HOA fees and assessments would incentivize lenders to 
promptly foreclose or take possession to ensure that the HOA receives what 
it needs to maintain the property so the lender can optimize its return. How-
ever, in practice, lenders receive the benefit of HOA expenditures without 
assuming any collection costs. Regardless of delinquent payments and fore-
closure proceedings, HOAs continue to expend funds to upkeep the prop-
erty’s value, which increases the value of the property in a foreclosure sale.161
Ultimately, lenders are not legally responsible for dues owed by their bor-
rowers and often refuse to refund any of these costs from its proceeds in a 
foreclosure sale, compounding the inequity.162 However, as discussed, the 
emergence of state super-lien statutes will help restore equity between HOAs 
and lenders, reducing the need to enforce delinquent fees against the debtor 
homeowner to a point that justifies an amendment to section 523(a)(16).  
D.? Proposed Amendment to Section 523(a)(16) 
Some would argue that section 523(a)(16) should be completely re-
moved from the Code’s discharge exceptions.163 The premise behind this ar-
gument is that Congress is substantially expanding discharge exceptions to 
include debts where no culpable conduct is required, and where compelling 
public policy concerns are not apparent.164 Pertaining to section 523(a)(16) 
these critics suggest that expansion of nondischargeability to include HOA 
fees, absent the showing of wrongful conduct, is a major change in bank-
ruptcy policy to benefit a special interest group that will erode the bank-
ruptcy’s “fresh start” policy.165
161 Wells, supra note 124, at 478. 
162 Id.
163 Miles, supra note 9, at 804. 
164 Id. at 803. 
165 Id. at 803 n.42. 
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Although it is true that simply not paying a creditor does not rise to the 
level of misconduct that the Code originally set out to except from discharge, 
being a freeriding member at the expense of other HOA members might. This 
is to say that there are strong policy reasons for allowing some aspects of 
section 523(a)(16) to remain part of the Code. For example, beyond offering 
protection to HOAs, section 523(a)(16) also exists to protect members of the 
HOA community and their property values. Allowing an individual to benefit 
from personal and communal property without paying his or her personal 
dues is not something that the association, or its members, should have to 
tolerate, and this is what the 1994 provision sought to prevent. Therefore, 
section 523(a)(16) should exist only to prevent the freeriding member and 
should not apply to those who do not continue to possess or financially ben-
efit from the property after bankruptcy.  
This Comment’s proposed provision would read similarly to the 1994 
provision in all aspects except for the addition of language clarifying that 
homeowners associations are included within the exception. Here is the 
amendment as proposed: 
A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor 
from any debt . . . for a fee or assessment that becomes due 
and payable after the order for relief to a membership asso-
ciation with respect to the debtor’s interest in a dwelling unit 
that has condominium ownership, in a share of a cooperative 
housing corporation, or a lot in a homeowner’s association,
but only if such fee or assessment is payable for a period 
during which—  
(A) the debtor physically occupied a dwelling unit in the 
condominium or cooperative project; or  
(B) the debtor rented the dwelling unit to a tenant and 
received payments from the tenant for such period, but 
nothing in this paragraph shall except from discharge the 
debt of a debtor for a membership association fee or 
pending or subsequent bankruptcy case.166
The purpose of this proposal is to relieve the burden of accruing assess-
ments from non freeriding members while keeping debtors who continue to 
use their property for personal use or for generating rental income responsible 
for assessments coming due after filing.167
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Considering the purpose of section 523 discharge exceptions, which is 
to hold debtors responsible for their debts pertaining to personal misconduct 
or an important policy issue, Congress should be able to articulate, with spec-
ificity, which category the discharge exception pertains to and why. Although 
protecting the interests of HOAs is important, Congress may find itself bend-
ing to the demands of every group of creditors if it is not careful to draw a 
line between public policy and creditor protection. In this case, public policy 
should not tolerate freeriding members. However, burdening non-freeriding 
debtors to the extent section 523(a)(16) does, solely pertains to creditor pro-
tection. Certain creditors may be entitled to additional protection, but in light 
of bankruptcy policy, this should not be liberally granted.168 Because an HOA 
has the ability to prioritize its lien, foreclose on its assessments, and collect 
rent on the property, there simply is not a compelling justification for extend-
ing protection beyond what is required to serve the policy interests. 
E.? The Surviving Lien 
A discharge in bankruptcy extinguishes only one mode of enforcing a 
claim—namely, an action against the debtor in personam—while leaving in-
tact another—namely, an action against the debtor in rem.169 This means that 
any assessment lien placed on the homeowner’s property prior to the owner’s 
subsequent bankruptcy will survive the bankruptcy and not alter the HOA’s 
in rem rights. It also means that a lien can be placed on the property even if 
an in personam claim against the debtor is discharged through bankruptcy.  
The Code’s treatment of liens further suggests that section 523(a)(16) 
does not strike a fair balance between protecting creditor’s rights while 
providing the debtor a fresh start. Essentially, section 523(a)(16) proffers the 
creditor two causes of action, allowing both causes their full force and effect. 
Therefore, the proposed amendment stands to better balance the dual pur-
poses of bankruptcy by allowing creditors to keep both rights of action 
against freeriding members and discharging an in personam action against a 
non-freeriding debtor. Even those who argue that bankruptcy discourages 
people from paying their debts and should be limited to those in extreme 
168 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (stating that the purpose of the bankruptcy 
code is to provide the honest debtor a fresh start, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-
existing debt). 
169 See City of Richmond v. Bird, 249 U.S. 174, 177 (1919) (“Section 67 d . . . declares that liens 
given or accepted in good faith and not in contemplation of or in fraud upon this act, shall not be affected 
by it.”); see also Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991). 
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difficulty,170 would likely conclude that a debtor forced to abandon its home 
has fallen upon extremely difficult times. 
However, the adage that “liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected” 
may not always be reliable.171 Section 1141(c) of the Code states:  
Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this 
section and except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the 
order confirming the plan, after confirmation of a plan, the 
property dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all claims 
and interests of creditors, equity security holders, and of gen-
eral partners in the debtor.172
The Seventh Circuit determined that unless the lien is expressly pre-
served by the terms of the Plan of Reorganization the lien is voided by the 
confirmation of that Plan.173 The court limited the decision to situations 
where the secured creditor “participates in the reorganization,” otherwise sec-
tion 1141(c) would not apply.174 Moreover, the holding of In re Penrod is 
expressly limited to situations where a secured creditor has participated in a 
Chapter 11 plan of reorganization, and the plan does not specifically provide 
for the preservation of the creditor’s lien.175 However, let this serve as a warn-
ing to HOAs participating in a debtor’s Chapter 11 plan. Although Chapter 
11 cases are normally filed by businesses rather than individuals, an individ-
ual debtor may still choose to reorganize its debts in an effort to restructure 
its finances and protect its assets. Therefore, in order to retain the assessment 
lien after bankruptcy, it might be necessary to expressly include the lien as 
part of the debtors plan, at least according to the Seventh Circuit. 
III.? CONCLUSION
The take away from this Comment is that the Bankruptcy Code should 
strive to balance the interests of both creditors and debtors. Presently, section 
523(a)(16) tips the balance in favor of HOA creditors at the expense of 
debtor-members who no longer possess the property or benefit from it. The 
reason it is difficult to justify the expansion of this creditor protection is that 
there are already reliable mechanisms that can be used to help HOAs receive 
payment of their assessments and prompt banks to foreclose such as first 
170 Beth A. Buchanan Staudenmaier, Survival of Liens: “Liens Pass Through Bankruptcy Unaf-
fected”—Or Do They? 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 445, 461 (1996). 
171 See In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1995). 
172  11 U.S.C.A. § 1141(c) (West 2017). 
173 In re Penrod, 50 F.3d at 463. 
174 Id.
175 Id. at 462–64. 
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priority status, super-lien status, HOA assessment lien foreclosure, and the 
surviving lien. However, lobbyists successfully convinced Congress that the 
only way HOAs could maintain their community would be by ensuring that 
someone was on the hook for the unpaid assessments and, as the legal owner 
of the property, the debtor-member was the easy target. However, the deci-
sion to create this discharge exception neglected the heavy burdens that are 
placed on the debtor and the paths to repayment available to HOAs. 
The Comment also seeks to remind Congress, as well as those contem-
plating these issues, that the “fresh start” policy was not solely intended as a 
gift to debtors at the expense of creditors. Although the policy enables debt-
ors to once again become a productive member of society, and relieves them 
of the hopelessness associated with the burden of excessive debt, the policy 
also serves economic purposes. A fresh start reduces the administrative costs 
of bankruptcy by incentivizing the debtor to cooperate in the debtor’s distri-
bution of assets. Furthermore, the fresh start encourages economic activity 
by shifting resources to their most productive use and by eliminating some 
of the risks of business failure. 
Therefore, Congress should revert section 523(a)(16) to its original form 
and include homeowners associations in the list of creditors to avoid the same 
confusion that resulted in 1994. Congress must recognize that super-lien sta-
tus and HOA assessment lien foreclosure are better methods of collecting 
payment for default assessments than relying on an insolvent debtor to make 
these payments. Because these mechanisms exist, section 523(a)(16) offers 
excessive creditor protection that should be curtailed. Under the proposed 
approach, the non-freeriding debtor would be freed from accumulating HOA 
debt, the HOA would receive a due paying member or tenant quicker, and 
lenders would retain their priority lien status.  
 Even if Congress chooses not to support super liens, an HOAs ability 
to foreclose on its lien and hold title until the first lien holder forecloses is a 
boon for the HOA. Possessory rights will allow the HOA to receive rent on 
the property in the short-term while the lender goes through its own foreclo-
sure process. If the lender has ownership rights but does not take possession 
of the property, the lender may choose to redeem the property during the 
HOA foreclosure. In this case the lender would have to pay whatever is owed 
to the association. Therefore, regardless of how the lender decides to act, the 
HOA has the ability to produce income on the property to cover, and perhaps 
exceed, the debtor-members default assessments. Because of the surviving 
lien, the HOA need not be concerned that their in rem rights will be extin-
guished along with the debtors prepetition debt. Thus, an HOA lien foreclo-
sure covers both prepetition and post-petition assessments, allowing the HOA 
to cover all loss. 
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Ultimately, these mechanisms question the logic of leaving a debtor 
homeowner on the hook for accumulating assessments for as long as it takes 
their mortgagee to foreclose, which often takes years. Excepting these debts 
from discharge would be squarely aligned with Bankruptcy’s fresh start pol-
icy and would better balances the goals of bankruptcy: creditor protection 
and a fresh start for debtors.  
